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Abstract
The U.S. National Market System (NMS), the largest marketplace in the world for securities and
exchange traded funds, suffers from geographic market fragmentation which leads to reduced market
efficiency.
Communication lines transmit price updates and other information between geographically iso-
lated exchanges at varying speeds, bounded above by the speed of light. Market participants have
access to federally mandated information provided by the Securities Information Processor (SIP) and
privately offered information provided by the exchanges, often called direct feeds. These feeds are
quantitatively and qualitatively distinct, with the direct feeds tending to provide more information
at a faster rate than the SIP feed.
Differences between the SIP and direct feeds can lead to information asymmetries between market
participants, which in turn create arbitrage opportunities. Under the market conditions of the
NMS in 2016, these arbitrage opportunities occur regularly and many can be captured by market
participants with fast connectivity. Several methods exist which allow market participants to reduce
their communication latency with trading centers, including the practice of co-location where market
participants pay to have their trading infrastructure located in the same building as the matching
engines of an exchange.
Such regularly occurring and executable arbitrage opportunities run counter to the Efficient-
Market Hypothesis (EMH) in all forms, where even the weak form of the EMH claims that market
participants should not be able to systematically profit from market inefficiencies [1, 2].
This thesis investigates the market inefficiencies and related effects introduced by geographic
market fragmentation in two baskets of stocks: the Dow Jones Industrial Average (Dow), and the
30 largest stocks by market capitalization in the Standard & Poor’s 500 index (S&P 30).
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The U.S. National Market System
Stock markets have existed in the U.S. for nearly its entire lifetime, with the creation of the Philadel-
phia Stock Exchange (PSX) in 1790 and the first stirrings of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
occurring in 1792. However, these early markets were highly fragmented and scarcely regulated,
allowing for predatory or manipulative trading and wide deviations in the pricing of assets. As
markets became larger, regulatory oversight increased.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 formed the basis of federal regulations on stock trading
and instituted the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), the authority responsible for enforcing
market regulations and proposing new rules. In addition to its official responsibilities the SEC strives
for other goals including the protection of investors, the maintenance of orderly and efficient markets,
and the facilitation of capital formation [3]. In 1972 the SEC began its pursuit of a more unified
National Market System (NMS), and Congress authorized the SEC to develop the NMS under the
Securities Acts Amendments of 1975. These efforts culminated in the a set of regulations titled
Regulation National Market System [4], often shortened to Reg. NMS, which aimed to tighten the
coupling between disparate exchanges in light of the development of electronic exchange mechanisms
which increase trading speeds and tightened bid-ask spreads.
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Regulation NMS
Reg. NMS was created with the overarching goal of creating a unified National Stock Market and
with two design objectives: to promote competition between markets and between orders, and to
serve the interests of long-term investors and listing companies [4]. Reg. NMS is composed of several
rules and regulations, the most important of which are summarized below. See [4] for more details.
Order Protection Rule
The Order Protection Rule (Rule 611), also known as the Trade-through Rule, is meant to protect
orders from trade-throughs, which occur when a market center matches an order against a local
counter-party when a better price is available via a protected quotation displayed by an alternative
market center. Note that a “better” price in this context is defined from the perspective of the new
order entering the market. Therefore a lower execution price is be considered better for an entering
bid (offer to buy), while a higher execution price is be considered better for an entering ask (offer
to sell).
A protected quotation is defined in Reg. NMS as a bid or ask quotation that satisfies the following
properties: the quotation must be automated, the quotation must be displayed by an automated
trading center, and the quotation must offer the lowest ask price or highest bid price among all
publicly displayed quotations.
A quotation is considered automated if it may be executed without human intervention (up
to the full listed quantity), allows for the correct execution of Immediate-Or-Cancel (IOC) orders
against the quotation, immediately provides a response to the sender of an Immediate-Or-Cancel
order indicating the execution status of that order, and immediately updates the quotation to reflect
any changes to its status.
A trading center is considered automated if it implements systems and procedures that allow it to
display automated quotations as defined above, and quotations that do not satisfy the requirements
of an automated quotation are identified as manual quotations as quickly as possible.
Trade-throughs are prohibited Under Rule 611, however exceptions are allowed for Intermarket
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Sweep Orders (ISO), quotations displayed by markets that fail to meet the reporting requirements
for automated quotations, and flickering quotations with multiple prices displayed in a single second.
Access Rule
The Access Rule (Rule 610) concerns itself with setting standards for access to quotations in NMS
stocks, and caps the fees that an exchange may charge for accessing its protected quotations at
$0.003 per share. Rule 610 allows for the creation and usage of private data feeds, often referred
to as direct feeds by market participants since they are offered directly by exchanges rather than
through a third party. Rule 610 also prohibits trading centers from displaying quotations which
would lock or cross a protected quotation from a different trading center.
A market is said to be locked if the bid-ask spread of that market is zero, in other words there
exists a resting bid and a resting ask with identical limit prices. A market is said to be crossed if the
bid-ask spread of that market is negative, i.e. there exists a resting bid whose limit price is greater
than the limit price of a resting ask, or equivalently a resting ask exists whose limit price is less than
the limit price of a resting bid. These effects are the result of coupling geographically fragmented
exchanges, since an order that may lock or cross a market would immediately find a counter-party
if the two orders were present on the same exchange.
Sub-Penny Rule
The Sub-Penny Rule (Rule 612) prohibits market participants from displaying or accepting quota-
tions for NMS stocks priced in an increment less than $0.01 unless the quotation price is less than
$1.00, in which case the minimum increment is $0.0001. Rule 612 is meant to prohibit the practice
of “sub-pennying” in which market participants could “step ahead” of a protected quotation by pro-
viding a negligible amount of price improvement, allowing the “sub-pennied” order faster execution
at effectively no extra cost.
The significance of this rule, with respect to geographic fragmentation and market inefficiencies,
is that the minimum increment for the quoted price of a traded instrument sets the minimum profits
which are made available by an arbitrage opportunity.
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Market Data Rules
Rules 601 and 603 are referred to as Market Data Rules and are meant to promote wide availability
of market data, thus providing all market participants with an accurate and reliable source of
information on the best prices in NMS stocks. These rules cover the organization of a consolidated
data feed for NMS stocks, the reward structure for contributing information to the consolidated
data feed, and establishes standards for quote and trade information provided to and provided by
the consolidated data feed.
In particular these rules concern the Consolidated Tape Association (CTA) plan which dissem-
inates transaction information for NYSE listed securities, the Consolidated Quotation (CQ) plan
which disseminates quote information for NYSE listed securities, and the Nasdaq UTP plan which
disseminates consolidated quote and trade data for Nasdaq listed securities. The information pro-
vided by the CTA plan and CQ plan forms Consolidated Tape A, and the information provided by
the UTP plan forms Consolidated Tape C. There also exists a Consolidated Tape B which reports
trade information for stocks listed on regional exchanges. The aggregation of Consolidated Tapes
A, B, and C form what is commonly referred to as the SIP feed.
Market Macro-Structure
The NMS, and market systems in general, may be considered a network of market centers connected
by a a set of communication channels1. Modern electronic market places are composed of comput-
ers communicating order information over network infrastructure, which primarily consists of fiber
optic cables. Trading centers are individual computers or groups of computers that receive order
information from market participants, maintain local order books containing active orders, match
orders to execute trades, and more.
In 2016 there were 12 active exchanges in the NMS: the NYSE family of exchanges (NYSE,
NYSE ARCA, NYSE MKT), the Nasdaq family of exchanges (Nasdaq, Nasdaq BX, Nasdaq PSX),
the BATS family of exchanges (BATS BYZ, BATS BZX, DirectEdge EDGA, DirectEdge EDGX),
1See Definition A.1.1 for more details.
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The Investors Exchange (IEX), and The Chicago Stock Exchange (CHX). The matching engines
for these exchanges are located in data centers in northern New Jersey, more specifically the NYSE
Euronext Data Center in Mahwah, the NASDAQ Data Center in Carteret, the Equinix Data Center
in Secaucus, and the CenturyLink Data Center in Weehawken. [5] provides an convenient graphical
presentation of the geographic configuration of the NMS in addition to information about commu-
nication latencies between each location.
Alternative Trading Systems (ATS), which are similar to exchanges but are subject to a different
set of regulations [6], may also trade NMS stocks and tend to be less geographically clustered. Forty
four ATSs actively traded NMS stocks in 2013 according to [7], thus as many as 56 exchanges and
ATSs may have actively traded NMS stocks in 2016 from a variety of geographical locations [8].
This geographic market fragmentation has a tangible effect on the efficiency of the NMS in
the form of arbitrage opportunities, which are guaranteed to form since information cannot be
transmitted between trading centers faster than the speed of light.
Data Feeds
Electronic market systems generate vast amounts of data, which can be made available to market
participants in the blink of an eye, and there exist multiple vehicles for obtaining market data in
varying quantity and quality. Data providers include the federally mandated Securities Information
Processor (SIP) feed, direct feeds provided by individual exchanges, and third party data providers
like Thesys Technologies and Redline Trading Solutions.
The SIP aggregates information about trades and quotes in the NMS. A summarization of these
quotes defines the National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO), which is used to provide a notion of “best”
price for each security across the NMS. Each exchange in the NMS also provides a “direct feed”
which often contains more information than the SIP, such as information about resting orders below
the quoted prices, and often provides information more rapidly than the SIP feed.
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Thesys Technologies
The data used in this study is derived from an authoritative market dataset provided by Thesys
Technologies [9].
Thesys collects data from each of the direct feeds and the SIP feed and combines the information
from these sources into a single comprehensive database. Obtaining data through Thesys has two
major advantages over using data directly from the SIP and direct feeds.
First, Thesys performs extensive data cleaning and organization making manipulation and in-
terpretation of their data extremely easy. Data inconsistencies, which are somewhat prevalent in
certain kinds of market data2, are reconciled using information from several feeds. Second, Thesys
collects all of this data from a single physical observation point in Carteret, New Jersey. Thus the
data is synchronized to a single local clock and is available in the exact ordering a market partici-
pant at Carteret would have received it. This becomes increasingly important when studying events
that occur at a microsecond timescale, where clock synchronization issues may alter the ordering of
events and degrade the quality of the data.
Having compiled data from all of the available market feeds, Thesys offers a comprehensive
dataset that includes trades, quotes, order flow, and administrative messages. The quality of which
is recognized by the SEC, who commissioned Tradeworx (Thesys’ parent company at the time) to
build their Market Information Data Analytics System (MIDAS) in 2012 [11].
Market Micro-Structure
There are several different mechanisms that can be used to match and execute orders in an electronic
exchange, the most common of which is the Continuous Double Auction (CDA). Frequent Batch
Auctions (FBA) have recently been proposed as a possible solution to some of the issues introduced
by geographic market fragmentation3.
2See inverted timestamps in [10, p. 13] for an example.
3See [12, 13] for a detailed analysis of FBAs.
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Continuous Double Auction
In a CDA multiple buyers and sellers submit orders to an exchange or auctioneer, which aggregates
those orders in a Central Limit Order Book (CLOB) and matches buyers with sellers. The matching
of a buyer and seller results in a transaction or trade, which is executed by the exchange on behalf
of the market participants when a buy order and a sell order feature compatible prices.
The first two components of the name for this auction type succinctly describe its most prominent
features. A CDA, as described above, is said to be a continuous auction since market participants
may enter orders at an arbitrary time and submitted orders are matched by the exchange as quickly
as possible, usually on a best effort basis. Likewise, a CDA is said to be a double auction since there
are multiple buyers and multiple sellers participating simultaneously, thus forming a double-sided
market.
The CLOB, which is maintained by the exchange or auctioneer overseeing the CDA, is a registry
of active orders that have yet to find a counter-party (see Definition A.1.3). The orders contained
within a CLOB are referred to as resting orders, since they must wait for a counter party before a
trade may occur.
Market participants may submit different varieties of orders to an exchange or auctioneer, the
most commonly supported order types are the limit order and the market order. A limit order
provides the market participant with guarantees about the execution price of their order, but provides
no guarantees about when that order will find a counter party. A market order provides the opposite,
guaranteeing that a counter party will be found as quickly as possible, but providing no guarantee
about the price at which the resulting trade will occur.
A market participant wishing to submit a limit order must provide the exchange or auctioneer
with a limit price and a desired quantity. When the exchange or auctioneer receives that order it
may be matched with any resting orders on the opposite side of the book whose limit price is at
least as good as the limit price of the entering order. If no counter party is immediately available
then the entering limit order comes to rest in the order book at its limit price.
A market participant wishing to place a market order need only provide a desired quantity. The
exchange or auctioneer may then immediately match the incoming market order with resting orders
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on the opposite side of the book until the desired quantity has been matched. It is common to
use price-time priority to determine the order in which resting orders are matched, where orders
featuring a better limit price (higher for bids, lower for asks) are matched first and orders with an
equivalent limit price are matched on a first come, first served basis4.
Frequent Batch Auction
FBAs appear similar to CDAs from a high level. One may notice that both auction types maintain a
CLOB whose purpose and form is identical, though there are several fundamental differences which
provide FBAs with theoretical benefits over CDAs.
The first key difference between FBAs and CDAs lies in the matching behavior of FBAs, which
match orders in batches after allowing orders to accumulate for some period of time instead of
matching orders as quickly as possible. During this accumulation time, orders fill both sides of the
book and the accumulation of orders allows for the estimation of supply and demand curves.
The second key difference between the two is seen in how they determine the execution price of
an order. After estimating the supply and demand curves as discussed above, the intersection of the
supply and demand curves identifies a unique execution price. A FBA may use this information to
provide a uniform execution price to all trades that execute in the same batch by allowing bids that
cross the identified price to be matched with asks orders that cross the execution price.
This batch matching procedure in combination with the uniform execution price provide the
potential for significant price improvement for orders that cross the bid-ask spread. Under certain
conditions and assumptions about the availability of market information, FBAs can be shown to
promote competition on order price and simultaneously reduce the asymmetries provided by fast
information and execution speed. These effects highlight the reasons why FBAs may solve some of
the issues introduced by geographic market fragmentation.
4See Appendix A.5 for an overview of order types and modifiers, and [14] for more information.
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Market Indices
A market index is a theoretical portfolio of stocks whose performance is used to track relative changes
in a market. Each index is calculated via a unique formula that usually involves the prices of its
constituent stocks. Two well known indices are the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA or Dow),
and the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index (S&P 500). The Dow and the S&P 500 are meant to track
general trends in the NMS and thus are interesting objects of study if one is interested in estimating
system-wide properties, such as market efficiency.
The Dow
The Dow is an index of 30 stocks that are selected by the S&P Dow Jones Indices company and is
intended to be a total market index that covers all industries except transportation and utilities.
The Dow is a price-weighted index and is calculated by summing the prices of a single unit of each of
its constituents and then dividing by a proprietary constant which is used to maintain continuity of








where c is the proprietary constant and pi is the price of a single unit of stock for the ith constituent
[15].
In 2016 the Dow was composed of 3M (MMM), American Express (AXP), Apple (AAPL), Boeing
(BA), Caterpillar (CAT), Chevron (CVX), Cisco Systems (CSCO), Coca-Cola (KO), DuPont (DD),
Exxon Mobil (XOM), General Electric (GE), Goldman Sachs (GS), IBM (IBM), Intel (INTC),
Johnson & Johnson (JNJ), JPMorgan Chase (JPM), McDonald’s (MCD), Merck (MRK), Microsoft
(MSFT), Nike (NKE), Pfizer (PFE), Procter & Gamble (PG), The Home Depot (HD), Travelers
(TRV), United Technologies (UTX), United Health Group (UNH), Verizon (VZ), Visa (V), Walmart
(WMT), and Walt Disney (DIS).
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The S&P 500
The S&P 500 index is composed of the 500 largest companies by market capitalization listed on the







Where pi is the price for a single unit of stock for the ith constituent, qi is the quantity of publicly
available shares for the ith constituent, and d is a proprietary divisor which is used to maintain
continuity of the index in the presence of company splits, company mergers, and similar events [16].
The S&P 30
The S&P 30 is an index composed of the 30 largest companies in the S&P 500, by market capital-
ization, constructed for this study with the purpose of direct comparison with the Dow. The S&P
30 varied slightly in 2016, with some of the smaller companies being replaced throughout the year,
which makes it unclear which 30 stocks should be considered as the S&P 30 over that period.
In order to make the decision quantitative, the market capitalization of each stock in the S&P
500 is obtained at the end of each quarter in 2016. These four observations per stock are averaged
and used to rank the stocks.
The top 30 stocks by this ranking were selected to form the S&P 30 resulting in the follow-
ing constituents: Alphabet Inc. Class A (GOOGL), Alphabet Inc. Class C (GOOG), Amazon.com
(AMZN), Apple (AAPL), AT&T (T), Bank of America (BAC), Berkshire Hathaway (BRK.B),
Chevron (CVX), Coca-Cola (KO), Comcast (CMCSA), Exxon Mobil (XOM), Facebook (FB), Gen-
eral Electric (GE), IBM (IBM), Intel (INTC), Johnson & Johnson (JNJ), JPMorgan Chase (JPM),
Merck & Co (MRK), Microsoft (MSFT), Oracle (ORCL), PepsiCo (PEP), Pfizer (PFE), Philip
Morris International (PM), Proctor & Gamble (PG), The Home Depot (HD), Verizon (VZ), Visa
(V), Walmart (WMT), Walt Disney (Dis), and Wells Fargo & Co (WFC). Table C.1 contains the
stocks of the Dow and the S&P 30 along with rankings with respect to market capitalization and




From the authoritative dataset provided by Thesys, indicators of market inefficiency such as ar-
bitrage opportunities and realized opportunity costs may be collected. A practical definition of
market inefficiency is used in this study, where market conditions that allow market participants to
systematically profit from price discrepancies are considered inefficient.
This chapter defines these market inefficiency indicators and describes the procedures used in
their collection and processing.
Arbitrage Opportunities
An arbitrage opportunity may be defined as a set of market conditions that allow for profit via the
purchase and immediate sale of a good at differing prices. Consider a market system (Definition
A.1.1) containing two or more market centers (Definition A.1.2) which are geographically fragmented
and connected via two or more data feeds (Definition A.1.6) with differing transmission rates. A
dislocation (Definition A.4.2) occurs at any time where a security is quoted at two or more distinct
prices among the feeds, and an arbitrage opportunity (A.4.4) is any half open interval of time over
which the feeds are dislocated and one of the feeds quotes the best price throughout the entire
interval.
Collecting information on arbitrage opportunities provides insights into how tightly coupled the
different exchanges and data feeds are, and allows for several estimates of the possible severity of the
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market inefficiencies introduced by geographic fragmentation. Additionally, estimates of the latency
between exchanges in the market system can be used to filter extremely short arbitrage opportunities
in order to provide a characterization of actionable arbitrage opportunities.
Calculation of Arbitrage Opportunities
Each arbitrage opportunity has four properties: a start time, an end time, a maximum value, and a
minimum value. Equivalently, a duration may be used in place of an end time when specifying an
arbitrage opportunity.
The arbitrage opportunities for a single trading day and a single stock are calculated by first
obtaining the complete list of quotes issued by both the SIP feed and the aggregated direct feeds
(a combination of the information provided by each exchange) on that date and for that particular
stock. Each quote in the SIP feed is matched with the price quoted by the direct feed at the time
that the SIP quote was issued, and likewise each quote in the direct feed is matched with the SIP
price at the time it was issued. These two sets are then merged and sorted by time of issuance via
merge sort, creating a complete view of the dynamics of both feeds throughout the trading day.
Note that quote time-stamps are recorded at the resolution of microseconds (i.e. 1.0× 10−6 sec-
onds) and that market events like quotations may occur multiple times within the same microsecond.
Thus, the stability of merge sort is desirable since it maintains the original ordering of elements with
the same time-stamp.
Once this master list of quote information has been assembled, arbitrage opportunities may be
identified by iteratively checking that the price quoted by the SIP feed matches the price quoted
by the direct feeds. Sequences of one or more consecutive non-matching quotations form arbitrage
opportunities, whose attributes may be calculated using the timestamps and prices of the triggering
quotes.
Realized Opportunity Cost
An opportunity cost is generally an abstract notion which represents the “cost” associated with a
particular choice or set of choices in light of one or more alternatives. Let the realized opportunity
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cost (ROC) be defined as the amount of dollars that could have been gained by trading at the price
quoted by the aggregated direct feeds instead of the price quoted by the SIP feed at the exact time
that a historical trade occurred. This definition provides an estimate for the opportunity cost of
using prices quoted by the SIP feed instead of those quoted by the aggregated direct feeds.
Calculation of ROC
The ROC may be calculated by first collecting the information about all trades that occurred in
stocks of interest in a desired time period. Each trade is then matched with the quoted prices on
both the SIP feed and aggregated direct feeds at the time that it occurred. Trades that did not
occur at their respective SIP bid or ask price are removed from consideration. This filtering step is
intended to remove trades that were placed using prices quoted by direct feeds or alternative data
sources, or trades which were placed with the intent to provide better execution in an alternative
metric (i.e., fastest execution, least information leakage, etc.).
The remaining trades in the sample are those that were placed with the goal of best price using
the SIP feed to determine what that best price should be. For each of these remaining trades
the side of the initiating order is determined based upon whether the execution price matches the
quoted bid price or quoted ask price on the SIP feed. For buy-side trades, those where the order
which caused the trade was a bid, the ROC for that trade is the difference between the execution
price and the best quoted ask price on the aggregated direct feeds. Thus the resulting number is
positive if the aggregated direct feeds provided a lower (better) price, and negative if the SIP feed
provided a lower (better) price. The calculation for sell-side trades, those where the order which
caused the trade was an ask/offer, is found by computing the difference between the best quoted bid
price on the aggregated direct feeds and the execution price. This formulation provides an identical
interpretation, where a positive value indicates that the price quoted on the aggregated direct feeds
is better for the initiator than the price quoted on the SIP feed (since a higher price is better for
the initiator of a sell side trade). Trades that occur at a time where the direct feeds and the SIP
feed are dislocated will be called differing trades. Differing trades are of interest because trades that
occur during dislocations can lead to market inefficiencies.






Qualities of Arbitrage Opportunities
Before attempting to compare the arbitrage opportunities of two groups of stocks it is helpful to
obtain a baseline for what arbitrage opportunities look like and how they behave. In short, this
section provides an overview of the distributions of properties of arbitrage opportunities.
Duration
If arbitrage opportunities are to be used as a meaningful indicator of market inefficiency then knowl-
edge of the distribution of the duration of arbitrage opportunities is required along with a notion of
the capabilities of market participants. With this information, one can operationalize the definition
of market inefficiency provided in Section 2 and begin quantifying the quantity and magnitude of
market inefficiency.
Figure 3.1 indicates that the vast majority of dislocations last 1 second or less, but the distribution
has a very long tail, indicating that some distributions last for as long as 10000 seconds (almost 3
hours). The left panel of Figure 3.1 fails to display the shape of the distribution since almost all of
arbitrage opportunities fall within the first bin, so a logarithmic x-axis is used in the right panel in
order to stretch out the contents of the first bin. With the logarithmic x-axis it is revealed that the
distribution of durations of arbitrage opportunities is approximately a log-normal distribution, and
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Empirical Distribution for the Duration of Arbitrage Opportunities

























Figure 3.1: Left: Empirical distribution of durations (in seconds) for arbitrage opportunities in stocks that
are in the union of the Dow and the S&P 30 plotted with linear axes. Right: Identical distribution plotted
with a logged x-axis, arbitrage opportunities with a duration of 0 were excluded. Any observed “0” duration
dislocations are the result of timestamps with microsecond resolution and events occurring at sub-microsecond
timescales.
that arbitrage opportunities are most likely to have a duration between 100 and 1000 microseconds.
Table 3.1 provides a more quantitative measure of the center of the distribution, showing the
median to be 559 microseconds for the left panel of Figure 3.1 and 571 microseconds for the right
panel, where 0 duration arbitrage opportunities were excluded due to the use of the logarithm.
Table 3.1 indicates that the minimum duration for arbitrage opportunities is 0 microseconds,
which may seem like an alarming number. This is an artifact of having timestamps with microsecond
resolution. If an arbitrage opportunity has a duration that is less than 1 microsecond, then the
observed duration is 0 microseconds.
Between Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1 a fairly comprehensive view of the durations of arbitrage
opportunities can be formed for the sample under study, but this does not touch upon how long a
market participant needs in order to identify and capture an arbitrage opportunity. Recent work
has shown that a market participant utilizing data transmitted by fiber optic cables would need a
minimum of 570 microseconds to reliably identify and capture arbitrage opportunities at an arbitrary
exchange [17]. Table 3.1 indicates that 52.86%, 47.86%, and 49.37% of dislocations are longer than
569 microseconds in the Dow, S&P 30, and their union respectively.
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Arbitrage Opportunity Duration Distribution Summary
Combined Dow S&P 30
Unfiltered count 178,476,945 120,355,462 130,374,761
mean 0.114859 0.073712 0.114163
std 5.276667 5.519033 4.822610
min 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
25% 0.000218 0.000216 0.000223
50% 0.000559 0.000624 0.000541
75% 0.001156 0.001190 0.001095
max 10789.825626 10789.825626 10789.825626
0 Filtered count 175,822,596 118,626,324 128,295,437
mean 0.116593 0.074786 0.116013
std 5.316329 5.559103 4.861512
min 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001
25% 0.000231 0.000227 0.000237
50% 0.000571 0.000636 0.000551
75% 0.001176 0.001202 0.001115
max 10789.825626 10789.825626 10789.825626
569 Filtered count 88,119,495 63,617,169 62,392,695
mean 0.232378 0.139245 0.238271
std 7.507748 7.590569 6.969153
min 0.000570 0.000570 0.000570
25% 0.000763 0.000768 0.000747
50% 0.001173 0.001127 0.001154
75% 0.002701 0.002484 0.002584
max 10789.825626 10789.825626 10789.825626
Table 3.1: Summary statistics for the distribution of arbitrage opportunity durations (in seconds) in the
stocks of the Dow, the S&P 30, and their union. Summary statistics are computed for all observed arbitrage
opportunities (Unfiltered), arbitrage opportunities with a duration longer than 0 microseconds (0 filtered),
and arbitrage opportunities longer than 569 microseconds (569 filtered).
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Empirical Distribution for Start Time
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Figure 3.2: Empirical distribution of start times for arbitrage opportunities in stocks that are in the union
of the Dow and the S&P 30. Note that on this scale 9:30am corresponds with 34200 and 4:00pm corresponds
with 57600, and the histogram is approximately binned by the minute.
Start Time
In addition to the duration of arbitrage opportunities, it is of interest to investigate patterns in the
start times of arbitrage opportunities. Figure 3.2, an empirical distribution of arbitrage opportunity
start times in the union of the stocks in the Dow and the S&P 30, displays such patterns for 2016.
Important features of this distribution are the rough “U” shape, which indicates that arbitrage
opportunities tend to occur at the beginning and end of the trading day; the periodic structure which
occurs at approximately 30 minute intervals; and that arbitrage opportunities have the greatest
probability of occurring in the last seconds of a trading day.
Following the claim from [17] that market participants need a minimum of 569 microseconds
in order to reliably capture an arbitrage opportunity, Figure 3.3 displays the distribution of start
times for arbitrage opportunities in the union of the Dow and the S&P 30 which are longer than
569 microseconds. A qualitative comparison of Figures 3.2 and 3.3 reveals only a few small differ-
ences between them, indicating that so called “actionable” arbitrage opportunities follow a similar
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Filtered Empirical Distribution for Start Time
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Figure 3.3: Empirical distribution of start times for arbitrage opportunities that are longer than 569 mi-
croseconds. Note that on this scale 9:30am corresponds with 34200 and 4:00pm corresponds with 57600, and
the histogram is approximately binned by the minute.
distribution of start times. Perhaps the largest difference between the two distributions is that less
actionable arbitrage opportunities start in the first or last seconds of the trading day. Additionally,
it is worth noting that the periodic structure at approximately 30 minute intervals remains in the
conditional distribution and may even be slightly more pronounced.
Magnitude
Under the definition of market inefficiency presented in Section 2, a market participant must be
able to systematically profit from a price discrepancy in order for a market inefficiency to occur. In
other words, if arbitrage opportunities are not large enough to recover possible losses incurred while
executing their capture then they would not be considered a market inefficiency.
Thus it becomes of critical importance to understand the distribution of values that arbitrage
opportunities assume. As defined previously, an arbitrage opportunity has two associated values,
a minimum value and a maximum value, which are signed numbers obtained by computing the
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difference between the prices quoted on the aggregated direct feeds and the SIP feed at a particular
time. An argument may be made that regardless of which side of the book is dislocated (bid or
ask) and regardless of which feed is favored (direct or SIP) an arbitrager may obtain a profit. If the
side of book and feed do not affect the ability to profit from discrepancies between the feeds then
all discrepancies may be considered identically as potential market inefficiencies. In the following
analysis the minimum and maximum values of an arbitrage opportunity may be reduced to an
estimated magnitude.
From the maximum and minimum value of an arbitrage opportunity, various estimates of the
magnitude of the arbitrage opportunity may be calculated. In this study an upper estimate, lower
estimate, and mean estimate are computed and analyzed jointly. The upper estimate for the mag-
nitude of an arbitrage opportunity is calculated as max(|M |, |m|) where M is the maximum value
of the arbitrage opportunity and m is the minimum value. The lower estimate is calculated in a
similar manner, min(|M |, |m|), while the mean estimate is simply the average of the upper and lower
estimates.
With the upper, mean, and lower estimates of arbitrage opportunity magnitude defined the
distribution of those estimates may be seen in Figure 3.4. Both panels in Figure 3.4, where the
left panel utilizes linear axes and the right panel utilizes semi-log axes, reveal relatively little about
the distribution of the magnitudes due to the extremely long tail of the distribution and the vast
majority of observations clustered at lower magnitudes.
In order to clearly display the distribution for smaller magnitude arbitrage opportunities a se-
quence of truncated distributions is shown in Figure 3.5. The lower-left and lower-right panels of
Figure 3.5 show that approximately from $0.05 to $1.5 the distribution follows a nearly linear scal-
ing in the semi-log axes, which indicates that it may be an exponential distribution with finite size
effects at smaller values and sampling noise in the tail. The lower-left panel and middle panels also
show that the distribution is extremely noisy and incomplete for larger magnitudes, indicating that
there may be too few observations of extreme magnitudes in order to accurately estimate the tail of
the distribution.
Table 3.2 provides summary statistics for the distributions shown in Figures 3.4 and 3.5. The
quartile statistics for the upper, mean, and lower estimate across all groups of stocks considered
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Empirical Distribution of Magnitudes
Figure 3.4: Left: Empirical distribution of arbitrage opportunity magnitudes (in USD) for the union of the
stocks in the Dow and the S&P 30, plotted with linear axes. Right: Empirical distribution of arbitrage
opportunity magnitudes (in USD) for the union of the stocks in the Dow and the S&P 30, plotted with a
logged y-axis.
are identically 1 cent, which is to be expected considering that more than 90% of all arbitrage
opportunities have a magnitude of 1 cent.
Continuing to investigate actionable arbitrage opportunities, Table 3.3 contains similar summary
statistics for the magnitudes of arbitrage opportunities that lasted longer than 569 microseconds.
The quartile statistics of the magnitudes of actionable arbitrage opportunities are identical to the
unfiltered statistics, and the maximum values of the upper and lower estimates are also unaffected
by the filtering, which implies that some of the largest arbitrage opportunities are actionable.
The Money At Stake
Considering that the vast majority of actionable arbitrage opportunities only have a magnitude of
$0.01, it may seem that there is no cause for concern. This section estimates the amount of money
that is at stake, and shows that arbitrage opportunities compensate for their small magnitude with
sheer frequency.
Table 3.4 summarizes the variation in the daily ROC for the stocks in the Dow and the S&P
30 along with information about the number of trades that occurred in those stocks and the total
dollar value of the traded stocks. This table provides a slight indication of the staggering amount
of money and information that flows through the NMS on a daily basis, where the average stock in
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Truncated Empirical Distributions of Arbitrage Opportunity Magnitude
Figure 3.5: Several truncations of the empirical distribution of arbitrage opportunity magnitudes, allowing
for closer inspection of the head of the distribution. From left to right, top to bottom: Magnitudes less than
$1000, $400, $50, $25, $10, and $1.
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Arbitrage Opportunity Magnitude Distribution Summary
Combined Dow S&P 30
count 178,476,945 120,355,462 130,374,761
Upper Estimate mean 0.0192 0.0137 0.0207
std 0.4250 0.5075 0.4705
min 0.01 0.01 0.01
25% 0.01 0.01 0.01
50% 0.01 0.01 0.01
75% 0.01 0.01 0.01
max 4,905.69 4,905.69 4,905.69
Mean Estimate mean 0.0172 0.0124 0.0185
std 0.2181 0.2581 0.2406
min 0.01 0.01 0.01
25% 0.01 0.01 0.01
50% 0.01 0.01 0.01
75% 0.01 0.01 0.01
max 2,452.85 2,452.85 2,452.85
Lower Estimate mean 0.0152 0.0112 0.0164
std 0.0548 0.0529 0.0572
min 0.01 0.01 0.01
25% 0.01 0.01 0.01
50% 0.01 0.01 0.01
75% 0.01 0.01 0.01
max 372.69 372.69 372.69
Table 3.2: Summary statistics for the distribution of magnitudes of arbitrage opportunities (in USD) in the
stocks of the Dow, the S&P 30, and their union. Three estimates of the magnitude distribution are provided:
an upper estimate, which is calculated using the maximum magnitude of each observed arbitrage opportunity;
a lower estimate, which is calculated using the minimum magnitude; and a mean estimate, which is the
element-wise mean of the upper and lower estimates.
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Actionable Arbitrage Opportunity Magnitude Distribution Summary
Combined Dow S&P 30
count 88,119,495 63,617,169 62,392,695
Upper Estimate mean 0.0208 0.0152 0.0224
std 0.5984 0.6927 0.6746
min 0.01 0.01 0.01
25% 0.01 0.01 0.01
50% 0.01 0.01 0.01
75% 0.01 0.01 0.01
max 4,905.69 4,905.69 4,905.69
Mean Estimate mean 0.0173 0.0131 0.0186
std 0.3046 0.3513 0.3426
min 0.01 0.01 0.01
25% 0.01 0.01 0.01
50% 0.01 0.01 0.01
75% 0.01 0.01 0.01
max 2,452.85 2,452.85 2,452.85
Lower Estimate mean 0.0139 0.0109 0.0149
std 0.0634 0.0660 0.0670
min 0.01 0.01 0.01
25% 0.01 0.01 0.01
50% 0.01 0.01 0.01
75% 0.01 0.01 0.01
max 372.69 372.69 372.69
Table 3.3: Summary statistics for the distribution of magnitudes of arbitrage opportunities (in USD) with
durations longer than 569 microseconds.
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Daily ROC Statistics
Trades Traded Val Diff Trades Diff Traded Val ROC ROC/Share
mean 2,173,227.02 22,942,181,028.67 479,578.85 5,484,307,205.40 1,023,810.67 0.0100
std 664,180.20 6,065,524,000.26 197,378.15 1,851,246,298.07 759,800.91 0.0000
min 867,849.00 10,309,350,518.75 134,239.00 1,629,850,369.65 257,330.28 0.0098
25% 1,772,851.00 19,582,689,594.59 362,590.50 4,342,718,696.25 699,310.08 0.0100
50% 1,975,163.50 21,354,839,008.28 429,866.50 5,060,135,078.76 858,644.22 0.0100
75% 2,370,977.50 25,339,612,943.56 535,865.00 6,131,997,746.36 1,082,441.21 0.0100
max 5,015,045.00 50,626,240,421.16 1,443,208.00 13,811,423,929.99 8,652,008.60 0.0101
Table 3.4: Summary ROC statistics over the 252 trading days in 2016 for the union of stocks in the Dow
and the S&P 30. Traded Value, Differing Traded Value, ROC, and ROC Per Share are all dollar values.
Aggregated ROC Statistics - 2016
Combined Dow S&P 30
ROC / Traded Value 0.000045 0.000042 0.000044
Diff Trades / Trades 0.2207 0.2230 0.2133
Trades 547,653,210 392,101,579 463,330,929
Traded Value 5,781,429,619,225.01 3,858,963,034,003.48 4,968,476,428,927.45
Differing Trades 120,853,871 87,432,231 98,841,785
Differing Traded Val 1,382,045,415,759.77 900,535,924,962.71 1,150,097,817,041.18
ROC 258,000,289.46 160,213,922.95 220,025,380.71
ROC / Share 0.0100 0.0100 0.0100
Table 3.5: Direct comparison between the union of the Dow and the S&P 30, the Dow, and the S&P 30 using
a variety of ROC statistics. Traded value, differing traded value, ROC, and ROC per share represent USD
amounts, while the other statistics do not have an associated unit.
the union of the Dow and the S&P 30 on an average trading day experiences more than 2 million
traded shares corresponding to nearly $23 billion changing hands. This trading activity is far from
perfectly efficient, leading to an average ROC of $1 million and an average ROC per share of $0.01.
In other words, the ROC statistic agrees with the analysis of arbitrage opportunity magnitudes
above, indicating that the capture of almost any arbitrage opportunity will result in a profit of $0.01
per share.
Over the 252 trading days in 2016 for the union of stocks in the Dow and the S&P 30 more than
547 million trades occurred resulting in the movement of $˜5.8 trillion worth of stocks. 22.07% of
those 547 million trades were potentially inefficient leading to a ROC of approximately $260 million,
or 0.000045% of the total traded value. See Table 3.5 for more details.
Since the ROC is estimated using trades that actually occurred, it is possible that it underesti-
mates the amount of market inefficiency since arbitragers may be imperfect, while it is also possible
that it overestimates the amount of market inefficiency since it does not account for the time a mar-
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Estimates of Total Available Arbitrage Profits
Estimate E(Value/Share) Arb Opps Total Arb Profits
Combined Upper Mag. 0.0208 88,119,495 183,288,549.60
Mean Mag. 0.0173 152,446,726.35
Lower Mag. 0.0139 122,486,098.05
Minimum 0.0100 88,119,495.00
S&P 30 Upper Mag. 0.0224 62,392,695 139,759,636.80
Mean Mag. 0.0186 116,050,412.70
Lower Mag. 0.0149 92,965,115.55
Minimum 0.0100 62,392,695.00
Dow Upper Mag. 0.0152 63,617,169 96,698,096.88
Mean Mag. 0.0131 83,338,491.39
Lower Mag. 0.0109 69,342,714.21
Minimum 0.0100 63,617,169.00
Table 3.6: Estimates of the total arbitrage profits (in USD) available to a perfect arbitrager of the union
of the Dow and the S&P 30, the S&P 30, and the Dow in 2016. Estimates are based upon the expected
value of the indicated magnitude distribution (in USD), the number of observed actionable (duration > 569
microseconds) arbitrage opportunities in that group in 2016, and the knowledge that the minimum size for a
protected quotation is 100 shares.
ket participant would need in order to profit from the inefficiencies it attempts to describe. With
this in mind, an estimate of the total amount of money available to a perfect arbitrager may be con-
structed using the frequency statistics for arbitrage opportunities in combination with an expected
arbitrage opportunity magnitude. Using the mean of the upper and lower magnitude estimates for
actionable arbitrage opportunities, the total frequency of actionable arbitrage opportunities, and
the knowledge that protected quotations have a minimum size of 100 shares, indicates that between
$69.3 million and $96.7 million were available to a perfect arbitrager of the Dow in 2016. $93 million
to $139.8 million was available to a perfect arbitrager of the S&P 30, and $122.5 million to $183.3
million was available for a perfect arbitrager of the stocks in the union of the Dow and the S&P
30. An even more conservative estimate made using $0.01 as the expected value of an arbitrage
opportunity indicates that nearly $63.6 million in arbitrage profits were available from the Dow,
$62.4 million from the S&P 30, and $88.1 million from their union1.
1See Table 3.6 for more information about ROC estimates using properties of arbitrage opportunities.
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Comparison of the Dow and the S&P 30
The previous section investigated statistics and distributions derived from a sample-wide view of the
42 stocks under consideration. Once a baseline for the global behavior of these statistics and distri-
butions has been determined, the natural next step is to investigate the behavior of these statistics
and distributions in smaller groups of stocks or even individual stocks. The relative comparison
of these statistics and distributions between groups of stocks, as well as differences between the
sample population and smaller groups of stocks, may provide a deeper understanding of arbitrage
opportunities and their causes.
This section compares the Dow and the S&P 30, as defined in Section 1.6. These indices both
have 30 constituents, all of which are associated with large U.S. companies, and there is a fair
amount of overlap between the two. Of the 42 stocks present in either group: 18 are members of
both the Dow and the S&P 30, AAPL, CVX, DIS, GE, HD, IBM, INTC, JNJ, JPM, KO, MRK,
MSFT, PFE, PG, V, VZ, WMT, XOM; 12 are members of the Dow and not the S&P 30, AXP, BA,
CAT, CSCO, DD, GS, MCD, MMM, NKE, TRV, UNH, UTX; and 12 are members of the S&P 30
and not the Dow, GOOG, GOOGL, AMZN, T, BAC, BRK.B, CMCSA, FB, ORCL, PEP, WFC,
PM. The number of shared stocks between these groups and the mechanistic nature of arbitrage
opportunities may indicate that the statistics and distributions derived from arbitrage opportunities
and ROC should be extremely similar, if not identical.
However, there are significant differences between these statistics and distributions when com-
paring the Dow and the S&P 30.
Differences in Arbitrage Opportunity Distributions
Following the same order of investigation as Section 3.1, the first comparison made involves the
distribution of arbitrage opportunity durations in the Dow and the S&P 30 respectively.
Table 3.1, located in Section 3.1, shows that the mean and median of the duration distributions
are different. A two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (KS test) and a two sample Mann-Whitney
U-Test (MWU test) are used to show that the difference between the distributions is significant and
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Statistical Comparison of The Dow and The S&P 30
Statistic p-Value
Duration 2 Sample KS Test 0.06035 < 10−15
2 Sample MWU Test 8086163730559262 < 10−15
JSD 0.02841 -
Upper Magnitude Estimate 2 Sample KS Test 0.05376 < 10−15
2 Sample MWU Test 7469278737700730 < 10−15
JSD 0.01754 -
Mean Magnitude Estimate 2 Sample KS Test 0.05486 < 10−15
2 Sample MWU Test 7468070356999940 < 10−15
JSD 0.01761 -
Lower Magnitude Estimate 2 Sample KS Test 0.04568 < 10−15
2 Sample MWU Test 7482113302991260 < 10−15
JSD 0.01353 -
Table 3.7: Statistical tests comparing the distribution of arbitrage opportunity attributes between the Dow
and the S&P 30. The Jensen-Shannon Divergence is a distance measure, not a statistical test, so it has no
associated p-value.
the Jensen-Shannon Divergence (JSD) is used to quantify that difference. The KS test and MWU
test are non-parametric tests and may be more appropriate than parametric tests in this case, since
the distributions under investigation may not follow common assumptions made by parametric tests.
The JSD is an information theoretic measure of the difference between two distributions, and has
several convenient properties. Namely, it is symmetric with respect to its inputs (i.e., JSD(X, Y)
= JSD(Y, X)) and its value is bounded (it assumes values in the range [0, 1] when computing the
difference between a pair of distributions and the base-2 logarithm is used).
When comparing the distributions of arbitrage opportunity durations between the Dow and the
S&P 30, the KS test returned a statistic of 0.05953 (p < 10−15), while the MWU test returned a
statistic of 8086163730559262 (p < 10−15), and the JSD between the two distributions measured
0.02841. These results indicate that the two distributions are significantly different, though the
magnitude of that difference is relatively small.
Similarly, the mean and median of the distribution of arbitrage opportunity magnitudes differs
between the Dow and the S&P 30 regardless of which magnitude estimate is used. Using the same
statistical tools as above indicates these distributions are also significantly different, though the
differences are again relatively small. See Table 3.7 for more details.
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Daily ROC Statistics - The Dow
Trades Traded Val Diff Trades Diff Traded Val ROC ROC/Share
mean 1,555,958.65 15,313,345,373.03 346,953.30 3,573,555,257.78 635,769.54 0.0100
std 463,558.93 3,891,299,900.31 146,677.85 1,234,882,079.43 655,911.15 0.0000
min 579,206.00 6,664,671,053.15 89,564.00 1,035,855,029.71 145,205.65 0.0098
25% 1,278,813.25 12,915,031,172.08 262,209.00 2,804,569,367.64 417,485.73 0.0100
50% 1,429,062.00 14,431,597,662.02 309,158.00 3,274,390,601.60 514,856.64 0.0100
75% 1,715,351.25 16,829,521,684.38 387,772.00 3,993,470,514.97 666,268.27 0.0100
max 3,596,006.00 30,999,914,293.66 1,073,029.00 9,428,952,387.10 7,817,684.58 0.0101
Table 3.8: Summary ROC statistics over the 252 trading days in 2016 for stocks in the Dow. Summary
statistics are computed over daily aggregates of ROC statistics. Traded Value, Differing Traded Value, ROC,
and ROC Per Share are all dollar values.
Daily ROC Statistics - The S&P 30
Trades Traded Val Diff Trades Diff Traded Val ROC ROC/Share
mean 1,838,614.80 19,716,176,305.27 392,229.31 4,563,880,226.35 873,116.59 0.0099
std 573,638.98 5,352,699,735.53 165,402.69 1,585,661,474.76 700,878.32 0.0001
min 738,844.00 8,775,273,579.14 112,238.00 1,322,682,479.53 218,378.57 0.0097
25% 1,494,204.00 16,716,749,687.31 292,734.50 3,564,986,358.00 590,618.50 0.0099
50% 1,672,011.50 18,310,212,120.94 348,020.50 4,173,715,014.57 727,405.38 0.0100
75% 2,006,113.25 21,724,903,514.15 445,005.75 5,184,500,948.62 929,452.58 0.0100
max 4,242,910.00 45,174,822,307.48 1,197,001.00 11,532,672,292.09 8,385,367.33 0.0100
Table 3.9: Summary ROC statistics over the 252 trading days in 2016 for stocks in the S&P 30. Summary
statistics are computed over daily aggregates of ROC statistics. Traded Value, Differing Traded Value, ROC,
and ROC Per Share are all dollar values.
Differences in ROC Statistics
Table 3.8 and Table 3.9 summarize the distribution of the ROC and several related statistics when
aggregated on a daily basis. From these two tables several qualitative observations may be made
about the relative efficiency of the Dow and the S&P 30.
The S&P 30 features a greater mean and median for every statistic except for ROC per share
when compared with the Dow. This indicates that the stocks of the S&P 30 experience a greater
amount of trading volume on average and tend to also experience greater amounts of aggregated
market inefficiency, as measured by the ROC statistic. However, the lower ROC per share statistic
featured by the S&P 30 indicates that the stocks of the Dow may experience market inefficiencies
with slightly larger magnitudes on average. In other words, when prices discrepancies exist between
the SIP and direct feeds stocks in the S&P 30 may experience slightly smaller price discrepancies





From the information presented in this study, several useful heuristics involving arbitrage opportuni-
ties may be formed. First, nearly half of all arbitrage opportunities in the sample lasted long enough
to be considered actionable under a relatively conservative definition. Second, the vast majority of
arbitrage opportunities have a magnitude of $0.01, which is the minimum tick size. However, it
is important to note that the tail of the magnitude distribution is long and extreme values occur
more frequently than some previous work suggests. Third, arbitrage opportunities are most likely
to occur at the start and end of a trading day.
By investigating the relationships between these distributions, a few more heuristics may be
formed about the stocks investigated in this sample. Namely, arbitrage opportunities with larger
magnitudes tend to occur earlier in the trading day (Kendall’s Tau correlation -0.04357, p-value=<
10−15), arbitrage opportunities which start later in the trading day tend to last longer (Kendall’s
Tau correlation 0.05956, p-value=< 10−15), and arbitrage opportunities with larger magnitudes tend
to last longer (Kendall’s Tau correlation 0.03927, p-value=< 10−15).
The combination of the ROC statistic and estimates from properties of arbitrage opportunities
place the total arbitrage profits available in the 42 stock sample on the order of $258 million for
2016. This number may seem small in relation to the traded volume of those stocks, however it
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can be argued that $258 million is extremely large in comparison to the $0 in arbitrage profits that
would be available if markets always satisfied the EMH. The existence, quantity, and persistence of
arbitrage opportunities as discussed in this study indicates that there are timescales and/or market
conditions where the EMH does not hold. The Adaptive Markets Hypothesis is more permissive
and allows for the existence of arbitrage opportunities, subject to various evolving market conditions
which effect their prevalence [18]. However, even if one assumes that arbitrage opportunities must
exist, should their current prevalence be considered acceptable?
Comparison With Previous Results
Bartlett and McCrary claim in [10] that only $11 million were lost to information asymmetries
between the SIP and direct feeds when considering the Dow from August 2015 to June 2016, which
is approximately an order of magnitude less than the $78 to $170 million estimated in this study.
This may be due to differences in the quality of data used, since [10] did not have access to direct
feed data and instead attempted to synthesize direct feed-like data using exchange timestamps.
Ding, Hanna, and Hendershott estimate in [19] that $32,000 in arbitrage profits were available
in AAPL daily in 2014, which closely matches the daily mean/median of $45,000 shown in Table
C.2.
Additionally, Wah found that more than $3 billion in latency arbitrage profits were available in
S&P 500 stocks in 2014 [20]. Naively extrapolating the $258 million in arbitrage profits for the
42 stocks considered in this study leads to an estimated profit of $3.1 billion for the S&P 500 in
2016. This extrapolation is the result of scaling up the arbitrage profits by factor proportional to
the number of stocks under consideration, i.e. 50042 = 11.9 ≈ 12.
Overall, the estimates of arbitrage opportunity profits calculated in this study agree with previous
work in rough scale, strengthening their validity.
31
Limitations
The working definition of actionable arbitrage opportunities used in this analysis rests upon the
estimate found in [17]. However, what is actually actionable may vary depending on the location of
a market participant, the existence of faster communication lines, and more. Additionally, the usage
of a conditional duration cutoff based upon the location of a market participant and the exchanges
required to capture each arbitrage opportunity should provide a more accurate estimate of the truly
actionable arbitrage opportunities. Though, adding this level of detail to the calculation of arbitrage
opportunities would significantly increase the amount of time and resources required to perform an
analysis similar to what is presented in this thesis.
The ROC statistic also has room to grow, since its definition and calculation involve no duration
component. More specifically, the ROC statistic would be a more realistic measurement of market
inefficiency if it considered whether trades marked as differing trades could reasonably obtain price
improvement.
Future Work
This thesis studies arbitrage opportunities in two small groups of stocks over the 252 trading days
in 2016, leaving two paths for direct extension. A cross-sectional study that encompasses a greater
portion of stocks and other exchange traded instruments would provide a wider view of how market
inefficiencies vary based upon the particular instrument under consideration. A longitudinal study
that investigates the development of arbitrage opportunities over time may provide insight into
evolutionary characteristics of the NMS.
In addition to direct extensions, there are also several related veins of research that may fol-
low from this thesis. One such example is the empirical study of order flow, which could lead to
improvements in the understanding of market dynamics and price formation.
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Conclusion
Geographic market fragmentation of the NMS has lead to the mechanical creation of market ineffi-
ciencies due to information asymmetries between data feeds that necessarily exist due to theoretical
limits on information transmission speed. These market inefficiencies are prolific, persistent, and
endure long enough to be reliably captured by well equipped market participants, which contradicts
portions of the Efficient-Market Hypothesis.
Up to $258 million dollars in arbitrage profits were available between the stocks of the Dow
and the S&P 30 in 2016, indicating that the market inefficiencies introduced by geographic market
fragmentation may be worse than previously believed. Beyond their immediate impacts, these
arbitrage opportunities are potentially more concerning due to the negative impacts they could have
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Definition A.1.1 (Market System). A market system, m = (V,L), may be defined as a network or
graph which consists of a set of one or more market centers (V ) connected by a set of communication
channels (L).
Definition A.1.2 (Market Center). A market center is a location, physical or digital, where agents
may interact with a market system. A market center, c = (B,A, I), may be defined as a tuple
containing a local order book, B, a set of valid actions, A, and a set of traded financial instruments,
I.
Definition A.1.3 (Local Order Book). The local order book contains information about the unful-
filled orders that have been submitted to a market center, allowing it to accumulate and maintain
state. The NMS operates under a Continuous Double Auction (CDA), where the local order book
for a single financial instrument can be thought of as two ordered lists of queues where each queue
is associated with a price and each list contains queues of bids or offers respectively. Other market
mechanisms are also valid, such as Frequent Batch Auctions (FBA).
Definition A.1.4 (Action Set). The action set defines the valid actions at a market center. No
requirements are imposed on the action set, though a simple real world action set might allow for
the submission of limit orders (which guarantee price), market orders (which guarantee execution),
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modification of resting orders, and cancellation of resting orders. (i.e. A = {limit order, market
order, modify, cancel})
Definition A.1.5 (System Activity). Let the system activity, A, be a chronological list of all actions
that are performed in a market system. This includes actions performed by market participants,
administrative messages transmitted by regulators, and messages transmitted by the exchange(s).
Definition A.1.6 (Data Feed). A data feed, D, is defined to be any subset of of the system activity
of a market system (i.e. D ⊆ A). Note that recorded occurrence times of identical events may vary
between distinct data feeds due to physical considerations (e.g., speed of light, relativity).
Financial Instruments
Definition A.2.1 (Security). A security is a financial instrument that represents partial or total
ownership of an object or entity. Securities are fungible; securities belonging to the same “class”
have the same value, and therefore are interchangeable. Additionally, the exact value of a security
is negotiable. Common varieties of securities include stocks, bonds, and options, all of which may
be traded on electronic markets, such as the NMS.
Definition A.2.2 (Stock). Stocks, which are sometimes referred to as equities, are a variety of
security that represents partial ownership of a publicly traded company. Stocks are a vehicle by
which companies can acquire the capital necessary to grow and the secondary market for stocks is
the basis of a large portion of the U.S. financial industry.
The Best Bid/Offer
The following definitions assume the existence of a market system, m = (V,L), where each v ∈ V has
an action set, A, where {limit order} ⊆ A, and at least one data feed, D, which contains information
about the top of the book at each market venue (i.e., a comprehensive quote feed).
Definition A.3.1 (Local Best Bid/Offer). The local best bid for a financial instrument, i, at
market venue, v, at a time, t, is given by the tuple (p, q), where p is the maximum price among all
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active bids for i in v (as observed via data feed D) and q is the quantity of shares of i currently
available at that price at v (i.e. LBB(D, v, i, t) = (p, q)). The local best offer is defined similarly,
but uses the minimum price among offers on v along with the number of shares at that price (i.e.
LBO(D, v, i, t) = (p′, q′)).
Definition A.3.2 (Best Bid/Offer). The best bid is similar to the local best bid, but is formed by
the maximum price (and quantity available at that price) among resting bids for i among all market
venues v ∈ V (i.e. BB(D, i, t) = (p′′, q′′)).
Similarly, the best offer is formed by the minimum price among resting offers and the number of
shares at that price (i.e. BO(D, i, t) = (p′′′, q′′′))
Dislocations
The following definitions assume the existence of a market system, m = (V,L), containing two or
more market centers, two data feeds, D1 and D2, and a financial instrument i that is traded at all
v ∈ V .
Note that these definitions are phrased for the best bid, but apply similarly to the best offer.
Definition A.4.1 (Dislocated Data Feeds). D1 and D2 are said to be dislocated with respect
to the best bid of i at a time t if the two feeds do not feature an identical best bid price (i.e.
BB(D1, i, t).price 6= BB(D2, i, t).price).
Definition A.4.2 (Dislocation). A dislocation is said to occur between D1 and D2 whenever they
are dislocated with respect to the best bid of i over a half-open interval of time [a, b).
Definition A.4.3. ∆BB(i, t) = BB(D1, i, t).price−BB(D2, i, t).price
Definition A.4.4 (Arbitrage Opportunity). An arbitrage opportunity with respect to the best bid
of i is defined to be any half-open interval of time, [a, b), where D1 and D2 are dislocated with
respect to the best bid of i and sgn(∆BB(i, t)) = sgn(∆BB(i, a)) ∀t ∈ [a, b).
Definition A.4.5 (Direction). The direction of an arbitrage opportunity over an interval [a, b) is
defined as sgn(∆BB(g, a)).
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Definition A.4.6 (Duration). The duration of a dislocation or arbitrage opportunity over an in-
terval [a, b) is defined as b− a.
Definition A.4.7 (Magnitude). The magnitude of a dislocation or arbitrage opportunity over an
interval [a, b) is defined as maxt∈[a,b){|∆BB(g, t)|}
Market Actions
The following definitions provide a high-level description of the purpose and details of some common
order types, but are not necessarily representative implementations at NMS market centers.
Definition A.5.1 (Limit Order). Guarantees market participants an execution price no worse than
a provided limit price, but does not provide any guarantees about the timeliness of execution. This
may be implemented by placing a received limit order into the price queue associated with the
provided limit price on the correct side of the book (bid or ask, as specified by the order), assuming
that it did not match with a resting order at a better price.
Fields: Instrument identifier, bid/ask, limit price, desired quantity.
Definition A.5.2 (Market order). Guarantees instant execution on a best effort basis, but does
not provide any guarantees about the execution price. This may be implemented by matching the
market order with the best resting orders on the opposite side of the book until the desired quantity
is obtained. A market order may be thought of as a limit order with the limit price set in order to
guarantee execution (i.e. 0 for a market ask or infinity for a market bid).
Fields: Instrument identifier, bid/ask, desired quantity
Definition A.5.3 (Modify). Allows market participants to update values associated with resting
orders and allows for adaptation to changing market conditions. The main usage of this order is to
change the number of shares required to fulfill a particular order, since modifying the limit price of
order may cause it to lose its place in its current price queue.
Fields: Order identifier, field(s) to modify, new value(s)
Definition A.5.4 (Cancel). Allows market participants to remove resting orders from the local
book prior to execution.
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Fields: Order identifier
Definition A.5.5 (Immediate Or Cancel). Often shortened to IOC, this is a modifier which may
be applied to any order rather than a stand alone order type. The modifier indicates that the






Distribution of Arbitrage Opportunity Durations in Dow Stocks

























Figure B.1: Left: Empirical distribution of durations (in seconds) for arbitrage opportunities in Dow stocks,
plotted with linear axes. Right: Identical distribution plotted with a logged x-axis, arbitrage opportunities
with a duration of 0 were excluded. Any observed “0” duration dislocations are the result of timestamps with
microsecond resolution and events occurring at sub-microsecond timescales.
Distribution of Arbitrage Opportunity Durations in S&P 30 Stocks


























Figure B.2: Left: Empirical distribution of durations (in seconds) for arbitrage opportunities in S&P 30
stocks, plotted with linear axes. Right: Identical distribution plotted with a logged x-axis, arbitrage opportu-
nities with a duration of 0 were excluded. Any observed “0” duration dislocations are the result of timestamps
with microsecond resolution and events occurring at sub-microsecond timescales.
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Distribution of Arbitrage Opportunity Start Times in Dow Stocks
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Figure B.3: Left: Empirical distribution of start times for arbitrage opportunities in Dow stocks, plotted with
linear axes. Right: Conditional empirical distribution of start times, where only arbitrage opportunities with
a duration longer than 569 microseconds are considered.
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Figure B.4: Left: Empirical distribution of start times (in seconds) for arbitrage opportunities in S&P 30
stocks, plotted with linear axes. Right: Conditional empirical distribution of start times, where only arbitrage
opportunities with a duration longer than 569 microseconds are considered.
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Truncated Distributions of Arbitrage Opportunity Magnitudes in Dow Stocks
Figure B.5: Several truncations of the empirical distribution of arbitrage opportunity magnitudes in Dow
stocks, allowing for closer inspection of the head of the distribution. Plotted on semi-log axes. From left to
right, top to bottom: Magnitudes less than $1000, $400, $50, $25, $10, and $1.
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Truncated Distributions of Arbitrage Opportunity Magnitudes in S&P 30 Stocks
Figure B.6: Several truncations of the empirical distribution of arbitrage opportunity magnitudes in S&P 30
stocks, allowing for closer inspection of the head of the distribution. Plotted on semi-log axes. From left to





Stock Information and Rankings
Symbol Share Price Market Cap. Market Cap. Rank Share Price Rank
AAPL 108.3650 588,674,250,000 1 15
AMZN 724.1100 342,605,250,000 7 3
AXP 65.0700 60,897,056,768 39 29
BA 136.0575 85,909,215,232 37 9
BAC 16.1350 164,734,500,000 21 42
BRK.B 148.5300 366,148,750,000 6 7
CAT 83.4650 48,739,393,536 41 23
CMCSA 65.4150 158,159,250,000 27 28
CSCO 29.7750 149,579,500,000 31 41
CVX 105.2125 198,394,250,000 18 17
DD 67.1225 58,571,190,272 40 27
DIS 98.5525 158,958,750,000 26 19
FB 117.9250 338,086,000,000 8 13
GE 31.1225 282,407,750,000 10 40
GOOG 746.5400 519,468,000,000 3 2
GOOGL 765.7350 519,468,000,000 2 1
GS 176.5700 75,577,461,760 38 4
HD 130.9700 162,088,250,000 24 10
IBM 157.0175 150,224,000,000 30 6
INTC 34.7925 164,545,500,000 22 38
JNJ 115.7100 317,181,750,000 9 14
JPM 68.5600 248,467,000,000 12 26
KO 43.8750 189,596,750,000 19 35
MCD 120.7750 104,620,209,360 34 11
MMM 174.1375 105,269,000,000 33 5
MRK 57.9500 160,298,750,000 25 30
MSFT 56.5350 442,765,000,000 4 31
NKE 55.0375 92,671,447,504 35 32
ORCL 39.8925 164,379,750,000 23 37
PEP 105.4550 152,207,500,000 28 16
PFE 32.8000 199,846,250,000 17 39
PG 85.2025 228,141,500,000 14 22
PM 97.1350 150,685,250,000 29 20
T 41.3800 254,488,500,000 11 36
TRV 118.1800 34,257,640,448 42 12
UNH 142.5350 135,615,000,000 32 8
UTX 103.4675 86,217,687,040 36 18
V 77.8425 184,334,000,000 20 24
VZ 53.8200 219,440,750,000 16 33
WFC 48.7700 246,265,250,000 13 34
WMT 70.6875 219,609,750,000 15 25
XOM 88.7175 368,008,250,000 5 21
Table C.1: Share price (in USD) and market capitalization (in USD) for the stocks under study, computed
using the average of four observations taken at the end of each quarter in 2016, as well as rankings of the
stocks according to their share price and market capitalization. Since the S&P 30 is a market cap. weighted
index, the Market Cap. Rank indicates the relative effect each stock would have on the S&P 30. The Share
Price Rank has a similar interpretation for the Dow, since it is a share price weighted index.
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Daily ROC Statistics - 2016 - Itemized By Stock
Symbol Trades Traded Val Diff Trades Diff Traded Val ROC ROC/Share
AAPL mean 174,820.85 2,542,188,952.00 34,316.58 483,265,898.89 45,852.81 0.0090
std 68,897.09 1,040,923,482.82 20,556.77 280,321,422.73 27,275.35 0.0015
min 54,824.00 983,856,430.54 2,112.00 35,009,317.38 2,773.35 0.0033
25% 129,830.00 1,872,512,861.35 23,498.75 340,459,129.85 32,088.96 0.0094
50% 156,198.50 2,272,037,106.11 32,741.00 452,246,993.35 43,204.10 0.0097
75% 199,793.25 2,870,019,105.28 42,674.75 599,146,631.96 57,647.05 0.0098
max 517,270.00 8,280,915,338.59 103,885.00 1,596,912,962.05 138,331.08 0.0100
AMZN mean 15,247.79 792,584,183.03 5,323.36 295,465,467.21 36,209.44 0.0617
std 7,332.26 335,570,554.73 2,779.11 131,110,532.55 27,276.77 0.0256
min 5,896.00 318,618,478.15 936.00 54,345,232.16 2,925.31 0.0058
25% 10,367.50 552,563,427.87 3,569.25 207,214,150.84 19,174.63 0.0501
50% 13,622.50 709,879,550.69 4,842.50 286,035,318.63 28,451.90 0.0622
75% 18,410.50 950,115,228.13 6,699.75 370,801,518.10 45,197.83 0.0762
max 54,111.00 2,526,198,199.88 16,193.00 794,727,936.33 150,997.03 0.1264
AXP mean 32,348.46 250,614,304.97 9,086.69 71,464,081.61 11,622.14 0.0100
std 16,110.77 143,031,721.64 4,434.64 36,283,858.01 7,156.73 0.0002
min 11,095.00 90,438,986.65 2,219.00 19,241,382.52 2,666.91 0.0089
25% 22,756.50 168,209,590.34 5,999.50 49,149,197.52 7,672.38 0.0099
50% 26,835.00 207,178,850.49 7,476.00 57,481,058.84 8,987.37 0.0100
75% 37,067.75 277,456,051.09 10,905.75 86,485,488.61 13,792.36 0.0101
max 159,135.00 1,468,245,304.80 31,507.00 302,294,385.78 75,473.73 0.0114
BA mean 20,749.26 288,851,358.58 7,071.25 100,312,506.47 10,955.15 0.0126
std 10,435.29 154,859,396.19 3,027.87 41,626,820.43 6,235.13 0.0014
min 4,220.00 60,869,511.81 1,209.00 22,712,059.97 2,404.84 0.0095
25% 14,825.75 202,629,761.69 4,865.00 69,859,447.55 6,607.66 0.0115
50% 18,904.00 260,864,798.97 6,613.50 95,165,851.81 9,608.32 0.0124
75% 24,641.25 339,733,518.51 8,877.75 123,131,081.82 13,061.48 0.0134
max 101,159.00 1,496,951,020.26 19,630.00 303,000,376.46 47,010.92 0.0176
BAC mean 121,342.03 1,226,417,338.14 16,790.38 172,754,559.88 133,884.80 0.0097
std 63,081.55 671,525,306.26 9,444.79 103,812,115.35 209,464.23 0.0027
min 47,092.00 446,519,241.11 3,829.00 44,580,585.21 26,745.03 0.0017
25% 82,477.75 788,211,503.98 10,822.25 104,229,472.11 65,699.05 0.0094
50% 100,742.50 1,022,475,309.71 14,338.00 141,426,121.62 94,437.26 0.0100
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75% 140,287.75 1,421,516,325.93 21,049.50 207,433,016.43 144,912.96 0.0100
max 427,260.00 4,871,049,389.04 55,669.00 796,038,773.20 3,041,654.25 0.0328
BRK.B mean 20,319.82 279,507,272.57 6,127.18 95,881,014.18 9,043.00 0.0115
std 6,968.24 96,585,788.86 2,236.23 34,040,025.15 7,767.70 0.0008
min 9,369.00 128,393,899.66 2,833.00 47,226,477.55 3,639.32 0.0097
25% 15,692.00 211,781,989.51 4,642.50 72,927,387.38 5,853.34 0.0110
50% 19,071.00 265,611,819.32 5,569.50 87,606,321.13 7,193.05 0.0114
75% 22,880.50 317,882,557.02 7,111.75 110,321,518.18 9,692.30 0.0118
max 60,437.00 759,560,842.28 17,403.00 271,880,756.87 94,453.60 0.0149
CAT mean 30,586.73 269,579,023.84 9,239.74 81,143,988.26 11,986.17 0.0104
std 11,384.23 107,296,519.47 3,721.88 30,953,831.34 8,988.83 0.0005
min 7,660.00 72,342,016.91 2,283.00 24,025,499.19 2,847.50 0.0075
25% 22,670.50 204,956,948.21 6,684.75 58,633,048.01 7,680.36 0.0101
50% 28,267.00 245,802,664.58 8,451.00 76,013,433.31 10,301.82 0.0103
75% 36,304.25 323,347,949.42 10,730.00 95,123,308.69 13,455.58 0.0106
max 77,886.00 964,799,514.35 22,381.00 222,261,612.89 100,244.92 0.0129
CMCSA mean 60,041.05 451,728,101.18 13,017.85 91,436,280.33 14,855.92 0.0095
std 24,892.69 183,551,477.13 7,898.99 51,910,212.49 9,307.13 0.0011
min 22,158.00 165,676,133.42 852.00 6,599,640.92 994.62 0.0026
25% 44,361.50 333,282,222.44 9,101.00 66,019,849.44 10,217.30 0.0097
50% 53,545.00 404,921,832.91 12,379.00 89,831,688.91 13,897.14 0.0099
75% 67,946.50 511,880,757.71 16,574.75 117,696,447.05 18,747.66 0.0100
max 182,217.00 1,323,876,760.25 44,721.00 299,063,397.63 52,791.06 0.0103
CSCO mean 77,364.30 493,693,519.98 11,555.12 74,134,548.33 26,409.30 0.0099
std 33,235.82 207,062,395.07 8,173.36 50,695,319.75 19,401.61 0.0009
min 31,865.00 182,535,557.30 660.00 4,502,758.25 1,461.77 0.0059
25% 58,015.00 367,489,467.23 6,881.00 46,381,850.87 15,394.81 0.0099
50% 68,328.50 444,190,912.86 10,643.00 70,264,638.23 23,922.43 0.0100
75% 86,368.50 548,980,902.84 14,364.50 92,558,544.11 32,439.85 0.0100
max 307,808.00 1,702,786,754.09 58,922.00 316,907,129.91 130,317.79 0.0213
CVX mean 44,441.79 462,460,384.39 12,439.81 134,648,014.78 17,036.07 0.0101
std 17,816.08 164,739,606.44 6,693.09 56,874,558.81 16,228.50 0.0005
min 13,879.00 144,582,207.22 2,377.00 28,830,654.89 2,456.15 0.0054
25% 32,594.50 346,722,417.91 8,344.75 97,784,127.50 9,772.81 0.0099
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50% 39,655.50 430,819,298.93 10,794.50 122,659,276.18 12,993.21 0.0101
75% 53,123.50 538,846,282.98 14,257.25 158,567,573.75 18,798.64 0.0103
max 148,515.00 1,263,782,534.87 50,186.00 423,871,063.95 190,901.32 0.0122
DD mean 18,036.06 132,521,012.09 4,913.74 37,476,052.09 6,342.15 0.0101
std 8,759.67 63,295,360.33 2,764.13 19,045,796.05 4,403.69 0.0005
min 5,262.00 40,582,912.43 773.00 6,491,584.69 832.86 0.0033
25% 12,017.00 89,557,470.32 3,123.50 24,611,595.27 3,912.60 0.0100
50% 15,462.00 114,690,819.55 4,104.50 32,687,710.05 5,066.52 0.0101
75% 20,793.50 155,332,165.60 5,499.00 44,016,133.46 7,243.21 0.0103
max 52,298.00 418,605,566.86 15,217.00 113,435,890.12 42,392.91 0.0113
DIS mean 41,156.78 495,392,306.10 10,535.97 129,495,234.75 39,331.64 0.0100
std 15,686.14 208,901,188.83 4,550.24 53,409,308.00 323,220.91 0.0007
min 17,030.00 203,854,389.74 2,633.00 36,156,641.31 3,221.94 0.0056
25% 31,892.25 374,803,933.38 7,657.50 97,517,442.34 10,284.53 0.0098
50% 36,745.50 430,039,189.49 9,220.50 114,691,273.09 13,055.17 0.0100
75% 45,623.25 558,118,900.42 11,989.00 144,599,501.14 17,818.25 0.0101
max 124,145.00 1,659,028,038.95 32,212.00 369,007,239.36 5,138,897.26 0.0180
FB mean 106,411.67 1,734,512,266.21 24,430.35 382,746,277.09 32,710.88 0.0089
std 52,106.73 851,612,136.44 14,883.35 218,536,974.53 20,257.94 0.0017
min 35,721.00 569,582,684.01 2,091.00 30,130,052.95 2,077.65 0.0026
25% 74,555.00 1,215,942,426.39 16,876.00 273,664,681.48 21,883.93 0.0093
50% 89,947.50 1,512,724,410.09 22,846.00 368,933,944.10 30,956.82 0.0096
75% 122,280.50 1,918,383,918.51 30,009.25 474,905,736.65 40,920.19 0.0098
max 410,069.00 6,838,289,214.05 77,754.00 1,288,151,142.55 104,657.25 0.0101
GE mean 83,963.26 741,830,493.33 12,828.05 119,789,470.34 44,606.60 0.0095
std 35,661.52 309,010,418.40 8,012.21 69,234,760.11 71,027.27 0.0015
min 27,905.00 290,466,991.56 2,653.00 33,035,264.68 7,844.38 0.0044
25% 59,365.25 514,268,974.25 7,603.00 74,660,777.81 23,089.88 0.0094
50% 74,767.50 670,261,948.27 10,589.00 96,944,717.80 29,655.10 0.0099
75% 96,517.00 876,527,780.45 14,826.00 141,143,821.44 45,447.71 0.0100
max 236,395.00 1,961,985,442.37 49,675.00 427,596,291.36 1,020,533.87 0.0261
GOOG mean 7,531.45 366,335,942.32 3,011.42 158,709,931.57 20,788.61 0.0732
std 3,658.82 182,235,732.35 1,689.38 88,251,186.14 16,264.74 0.0303
min 2,249.00 124,655,348.07 309.00 14,933,581.17 1,081.41 0.0105
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25% 5,132.25 248,778,207.21 1,962.25 106,767,269.08 11,265.70 0.0555
50% 6,801.00 329,863,400.24 2,809.50 149,899,630.13 17,390.24 0.0739
75% 8,621.25 423,295,739.44 3,763.75 193,904,103.00 26,178.89 0.0904
max 27,533.00 1,380,483,276.83 10,540.00 534,738,339.83 93,508.71 0.1669
GOOGL mean 7,702.79 386,290,407.80 3,139.58 167,728,031.42 21,666.72 0.0763
std 3,691.26 193,618,235.38 1,787.47 95,018,077.41 16,290.66 0.0305
min 2,577.00 166,653,629.71 389.00 22,136,548.67 1,488.76 0.0113
25% 5,385.25 272,598,797.58 2,021.25 109,053,238.60 12,006.00 0.0607
50% 6,607.50 329,884,754.37 2,887.00 155,883,718.95 17,816.25 0.0770
75% 8,442.75 428,950,041.69 3,770.50 200,237,315.54 27,440.66 0.0947
max 27,052.00 1,363,711,173.41 11,422.00 615,242,804.55 88,509.46 0.1689
GS mean 16,072.52 266,630,735.82 6,039.60 100,455,871.70 12,632.51 0.0190
std 6,759.46 124,491,943.62 2,299.09 38,813,844.47 7,817.49 0.0042
min 5,914.00 106,821,197.38 1,908.00 43,864,040.44 4,126.93 0.0068
25% 11,672.50 178,117,450.68 4,400.50 72,797,279.72 8,094.88 0.0161
50% 14,285.00 224,601,809.66 5,593.50 89,806,560.53 10,478.40 0.0181
75% 18,995.50 329,800,789.60 7,207.25 123,468,835.06 14,081.00 0.0211
max 50,816.00 857,877,495.97 14,393.00 247,177,637.53 72,612.29 0.0482
HD mean 27,728.62 366,840,862.69 8,920.89 123,442,984.04 12,744.17 0.0109
std 8,963.39 127,799,636.38 3,551.59 45,816,593.86 13,953.86 0.0008
min 13,006.00 165,434,810.90 2,515.00 36,439,575.01 2,864.63 0.0087
25% 21,668.50 276,025,739.12 6,473.00 92,772,210.99 7,812.18 0.0103
50% 25,747.00 339,935,686.44 8,234.00 115,952,305.04 9,863.20 0.0107
75% 31,341.50 416,697,720.23 10,762.00 146,870,527.07 13,201.84 0.0112
max 64,114.00 1,031,531,952.92 22,597.00 291,592,154.20 186,403.78 0.0141
IBM mean 19,503.60 283,053,487.10 6,540.58 97,629,157.53 10,322.91 0.0124
std 7,762.60 121,204,978.80 3,031.09 41,935,403.95 11,852.61 0.0013
min 6,168.00 83,951,134.35 1,493.00 24,252,638.00 2,042.64 0.0100
25% 14,595.00 209,597,644.74 4,586.00 71,732,705.50 5,972.78 0.0116
50% 17,729.00 252,167,134.97 5,852.50 89,826,517.09 7,844.79 0.0122
75% 22,431.25 328,204,236.66 7,532.75 111,719,286.16 10,385.29 0.0131
max 59,625.00 972,131,459.03 21,810.00 299,050,973.50 111,628.46 0.0164
INTC mean 88,012.92 539,061,461.61 13,623.27 80,485,200.80 24,652.76 0.0095
std 32,133.18 218,280,102.40 8,604.73 50,349,950.02 16,048.53 0.0013
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min 25,392.00 174,808,926.57 668.00 3,512,129.76 906.38 0.0031
25% 66,319.50 409,452,090.75 8,564.50 53,076,046.07 15,370.02 0.0098
50% 81,767.00 493,100,646.52 13,526.00 79,046,604.94 23,962.08 0.0099
75% 100,219.25 601,791,580.25 17,608.50 104,796,930.94 32,243.13 0.0100
max 233,578.00 1,765,833,707.79 48,079.00 318,483,188.44 91,380.43 0.0101
JNJ mean 41,248.16 516,784,968.61 10,117.01 132,739,127.27 15,971.14 0.0099
std 13,010.19 163,195,302.28 4,751.53 54,033,725.20 24,562.10 0.0003
min 15,606.00 194,794,413.45 2,156.00 34,113,674.01 3,046.94 0.0082
25% 32,847.50 413,846,348.61 7,231.25 98,042,130.74 8,347.87 0.0097
50% 38,411.50 483,292,741.16 8,718.00 117,582,458.80 10,975.76 0.0099
75% 45,961.50 586,813,347.06 11,288.00 153,593,921.79 16,623.58 0.0100
max 94,603.00 1,244,615,527.23 32,165.00 338,562,051.69 362,771.34 0.0106
JPM mean 88,003.57 801,423,694.85 21,356.75 193,852,644.59 29,550.37 0.0098
std 39,466.22 360,958,601.04 11,483.72 91,730,373.77 14,749.77 0.0003
min 30,040.00 331,806,293.97 4,953.00 58,788,624.46 7,089.25 0.0069
25% 61,325.75 565,821,050.04 13,638.00 130,610,914.09 19,065.50 0.0097
50% 77,139.00 711,684,130.50 17,913.50 171,373,698.77 25,663.01 0.0098
75% 101,690.75 948,789,239.22 25,153.00 232,200,018.53 34,390.20 0.0099
max 256,973.00 3,004,137,079.38 70,052.00 646,651,792.53 92,386.71 0.0101
KO mean 52,120.74 406,264,869.51 10,086.25 81,371,474.40 18,263.90 0.0099
std 19,287.46 161,269,975.11 4,577.72 33,628,799.23 8,429.36 0.0004
min 19,958.00 185,384,176.07 3,156.00 30,732,830.23 7,111.74 0.0066
25% 39,138.50 301,353,437.57 7,209.25 59,076,462.53 13,153.95 0.0099
50% 47,536.50 368,857,020.57 8,995.00 74,612,460.50 16,482.05 0.0100
75% 58,796.00 463,324,316.41 11,326.50 92,283,870.91 20,688.83 0.0100
max 151,901.00 1,308,364,552.46 30,895.00 222,649,014.88 88,890.33 0.0100
MCD mean 28,809.30 380,847,318.26 7,442.77 103,499,997.57 10,822.55 0.0103
std 9,250.20 146,529,362.71 2,681.91 39,288,571.37 10,847.35 0.0005
min 9,911.00 117,553,924.00 2,479.00 32,522,381.94 2,926.51 0.0091
25% 22,526.25 277,305,454.74 5,422.50 75,412,153.02 6,484.23 0.0100
50% 26,999.50 355,968,666.10 7,088.50 98,050,825.62 8,795.32 0.0102
75% 33,173.25 455,898,847.39 8,601.50 121,862,623.83 11,289.40 0.0105
max 72,028.00 1,044,773,633.09 20,018.00 265,940,261.14 114,279.57 0.0126
MMM mean 11,365.37 167,307,657.17 3,636.52 57,734,183.69 12,063.44 0.0134
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std 3,901.98 56,357,516.03 1,769.07 23,315,655.68 102,963.80 0.0018
min 3,704.00 42,376,029.54 852.00 12,737,335.17 1,268.98 0.0100
25% 8,870.50 128,614,072.44 2,564.00 42,198,399.30 3,302.92 0.0122
50% 10,484.00 156,620,977.62 3,148.00 53,116,097.50 4,412.75 0.0131
75% 13,011.00 192,588,435.88 4,113.00 67,265,920.46 6,182.75 0.0142
max 27,168.00 374,180,512.59 11,339.00 141,420,561.60 1,638,916.42 0.0211
MRK mean 52,065.45 404,241,094.10 12,269.51 97,773,420.29 17,435.31 0.0099
std 21,247.82 198,964,179.96 6,450.80 49,864,763.12 10,578.05 0.0005
min 18,727.00 139,953,296.94 4,541.00 37,156,365.39 5,935.82 0.0051
25% 39,157.50 302,275,577.81 7,789.00 64,970,853.90 10,991.95 0.0098
50% 46,619.50 360,181,487.45 10,518.00 84,618,791.63 15,107.30 0.0099
75% 58,293.50 460,791,595.64 13,950.25 113,701,288.72 19,811.20 0.0100
max 232,717.00 2,584,131,245.57 46,595.00 456,348,016.09 112,089.37 0.0156
MSFT mean 141,856.07 1,190,901,402.50 24,761.04 203,129,267.74 36,706.48 0.0095
std 63,588.22 533,057,860.34 17,480.90 139,593,661.04 25,629.62 0.0010
min 37,036.00 459,917,664.02 1,070.00 8,596,209.02 1,253.33 0.0040
25% 102,602.75 837,915,412.53 14,050.50 122,690,779.06 22,117.84 0.0096
50% 124,327.50 1,053,837,918.53 22,263.00 180,976,495.62 32,474.83 0.0098
75% 156,482.00 1,373,674,878.44 32,070.75 262,037,990.81 48,649.14 0.0099
max 456,106.00 4,125,126,448.00 98,307.00 950,946,403.87 138,913.71 0.0102
NKE mean 46,386.10 377,535,172.78 10,935.36 89,164,054.37 18,227.11 0.0098
std 15,357.30 145,806,631.19 3,796.12 32,750,534.77 20,652.07 0.0003
min 13,818.00 84,721,641.01 2,885.00 18,676,669.13 3,523.46 0.0072
25% 37,737.50 295,226,871.17 8,613.25 69,144,244.49 12,031.69 0.0097
50% 42,544.00 344,601,219.52 9,822.00 80,592,736.50 14,390.93 0.0099
75% 51,532.50 424,862,753.77 12,534.00 102,100,476.22 18,212.90 0.0099
max 121,962.00 1,195,681,284.35 28,410.00 232,923,873.16 280,266.40 0.0103
ORCL mean 57,682.71 396,195,204.98 12,588.18 89,349,468.90 23,090.45 0.0099
std 24,998.32 175,437,821.39 6,925.16 45,328,759.95 13,613.79 0.0002
min 18,500.00 115,616,594.93 3,976.00 25,275,961.69 6,296.00 0.0073
25% 41,096.25 279,206,895.10 8,045.50 60,516,930.73 14,818.30 0.0099
50% 49,330.50 357,457,037.05 10,544.50 76,162,800.69 18,686.12 0.0100
75% 67,876.75 454,604,488.64 14,292.75 103,662,921.13 26,306.23 0.0100
max 199,694.00 1,519,364,917.16 49,799.00 320,608,854.11 114,033.10 0.0101
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PEP mean 25,878.99 288,145,967.63 6,362.81 77,538,268.01 14,135.13 0.0099
std 7,302.44 87,491,020.05 2,685.75 30,490,556.29 95,874.35 0.0003
min 9,697.00 79,276,595.25 1,345.00 15,580,968.88 1,432.80 0.0087
25% 20,767.00 225,251,680.54 4,648.50 57,988,011.12 5,579.44 0.0098
50% 24,447.00 272,443,376.61 5,773.50 72,276,964.98 7,056.84 0.0100
75% 29,553.00 331,719,958.42 7,293.75 90,162,371.68 9,004.46 0.0100
max 51,761.00 639,054,176.76 19,175.00 213,566,531.33 1,527,179.69 0.0109
PFE mean 91,040.68 692,324,391.87 13,862.73 110,715,986.10 31,625.70 0.0097
std 49,256.08 473,362,104.74 6,672.49 60,406,629.99 16,222.08 0.0006
min 32,599.00 212,898,806.65 4,422.00 28,855,501.39 8,447.34 0.0059
25% 59,097.50 426,001,630.46 9,726.75 74,658,424.30 21,093.39 0.0098
50% 80,628.00 611,356,656.02 13,270.50 103,824,254.59 29,745.09 0.0099
75% 109,044.50 783,454,707.50 16,379.00 129,458,335.77 36,810.46 0.0100
max 474,221.00 5,427,524,575.47 56,238.00 602,885,333.66 145,936.99 0.0100
PG mean 50,438.27 570,844,223.65 11,760.85 134,139,256.91 17,786.87 0.0097
std 26,464.80 419,733,122.26 5,828.25 70,501,433.31 13,441.76 0.0005
min 19,980.00 185,431,171.67 3,696.00 40,926,831.50 4,789.61 0.0052
25% 34,682.50 362,299,048.00 7,530.75 87,831,864.68 10,158.57 0.0097
50% 43,215.50 456,219,304.50 10,168.50 113,664,173.39 14,134.84 0.0098
75% 57,796.00 612,257,033.06 14,163.00 160,102,759.35 20,335.25 0.0099
max 181,697.00 3,330,428,860.98 38,467.00 460,594,145.16 111,040.42 0.0101
PM mean 25,200.89 258,662,053.72 6,473.35 70,383,748.59 7,599.05 0.0100
std 7,898.99 89,749,492.42 2,363.46 24,104,316.15 2,884.22 0.0003
min 11,615.00 102,582,018.39 2,283.00 24,491,174.21 2,688.89 0.0089
25% 20,070.75 198,951,589.31 4,900.00 52,936,626.30 5,660.13 0.0099
50% 23,642.50 242,915,800.43 5,932.50 65,503,961.62 7,015.20 0.0100
75% 29,210.50 303,743,337.55 7,560.50 82,154,739.29 8,735.59 0.0102
max 70,626.00 730,181,888.71 17,838.00 179,429,529.04 20,452.43 0.0118
T mean 74,002.79 628,431,010.70 14,536.90 128,793,809.07 34,263.92 0.0097
std 29,190.92 263,898,792.99 6,237.26 53,639,641.10 19,413.10 0.0008
min 35,829.00 273,472,237.02 4,703.00 43,628,154.84 10,233.73 0.0043
25% 54,496.25 445,793,490.15 10,359.00 90,668,166.03 22,220.20 0.0098
50% 67,941.50 579,350,257.07 13,088.00 116,808,479.97 29,783.94 0.0099
75% 84,811.50 719,130,698.87 17,054.50 148,454,938.65 38,760.70 0.0100
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max 235,785.00 2,319,764,912.52 45,820.00 402,701,802.86 164,375.07 0.0121
TRV mean 10,544.19 106,389,400.10 3,568.88 39,506,286.77 4,441.92 0.0115
std 3,416.58 36,241,051.32 1,447.62 15,393,415.99 2,794.22 0.0011
min 3,018.00 27,592,851.46 771.00 7,628,101.68 964.98 0.0095
25% 8,487.25 82,492,360.44 2,705.00 29,702,903.75 2,990.61 0.0107
50% 9,965.50 101,071,670.21 3,334.50 37,475,398.81 3,837.38 0.0112
75% 12,010.25 122,831,584.80 4,172.25 46,650,233.97 4,933.57 0.0119
max 27,468.00 294,476,802.95 11,339.00 107,591,813.81 28,594.17 0.0165
UNH mean 17,446.67 228,660,097.56 5,642.65 77,377,042.02 7,680.73 0.0119
std 5,246.70 81,435,935.28 2,011.09 27,032,487.15 4,216.99 0.0013
min 6,412.00 89,234,548.68 1,849.00 26,225,274.13 2,378.89 0.0098
25% 14,129.00 173,512,633.11 4,413.50 59,089,553.72 5,357.03 0.0110
50% 16,636.00 214,637,619.41 5,371.50 75,046,042.50 6,539.35 0.0116
75% 19,932.50 260,900,529.94 6,717.75 92,546,473.56 8,912.00 0.0125
max 41,842.00 725,532,688.10 15,652.00 218,550,591.96 30,826.07 0.0178
UTX mean 24,903.26 263,375,122.23 8,217.23 88,158,366.16 17,510.92 0.0108
std 12,739.37 141,586,417.29 4,913.50 47,017,041.73 109,897.32 0.0007
min 5,358.00 49,595,310.95 1,315.00 13,549,323.03 1,579.70 0.0081
25% 16,977.00 182,655,118.69 4,942.75 59,862,917.81 6,260.83 0.0103
50% 21,463.00 229,710,235.45 7,034.50 77,766,133.91 8,629.70 0.0107
75% 27,806.50 295,642,614.43 9,447.25 101,084,369.56 11,780.77 0.0111
max 86,284.00 1,144,629,181.20 29,297.00 275,444,139.17 1,749,683.12 0.0137
V mean 48,950.33 460,497,961.48 13,097.62 122,925,302.52 16,818.68 0.0099
std 17,793.66 170,963,876.45 6,162.95 50,951,708.77 9,603.52 0.0004
min 23,142.00 162,781,451.21 3,273.00 30,311,313.92 3,873.41 0.0048
25% 36,797.00 351,926,962.18 9,092.75 88,092,316.21 11,157.63 0.0098
50% 44,660.00 411,627,578.41 11,552.00 112,507,821.59 14,624.21 0.0099
75% 56,347.00 531,962,904.82 14,735.00 139,117,677.04 18,457.99 0.0100
max 128,775.00 1,261,830,529.49 42,661.00 355,125,487.75 85,584.79 0.0106
VZ mean 62,098.01 494,149,523.80 13,525.58 109,544,287.76 51,450.08 0.0097
std 23,339.73 185,520,474.01 5,963.55 44,308,281.09 427,124.11 0.0007
min 29,671.00 204,408,079.42 5,039.00 41,836,595.67 6,539.31 0.0050
25% 46,137.50 362,469,762.67 9,445.50 77,277,337.22 14,070.98 0.0098
50% 55,823.50 449,943,857.51 11,922.00 100,842,957.95 19,546.38 0.0099
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75% 71,345.00 574,383,307.99 15,340.50 128,753,322.82 27,179.16 0.0100
max 147,919.00 1,264,130,771.03 36,340.00 266,067,716.19 6,798,041.07 0.0109
WFC mean 95,906.39 820,025,907.36 20,824.21 179,965,091.36 39,793.20 0.0098
std 45,245.25 431,043,219.13 11,031.12 96,747,201.74 31,259.59 0.0012
min 37,409.00 318,637,186.95 5,456.00 54,749,684.29 9,945.62 0.0067
25% 67,742.00 560,383,265.96 13,249.50 117,577,200.44 22,116.46 0.0097
50% 83,345.00 685,095,920.22 18,570.50 151,911,063.59 30,478.22 0.0099
75% 109,693.50 942,672,549.65 24,114.00 212,347,399.32 44,038.04 0.0100
max 403,924.00 3,956,788,572.60 83,572.00 795,479,504.39 320,409.40 0.0273
WMT mean 49,823.30 448,218,124.11 11,786.63 109,524,107.26 19,815.12 0.0099
std 20,042.63 187,614,765.33 5,642.63 49,138,231.17 26,412.77 0.0003
min 20,706.00 211,540,076.99 3,709.00 34,219,678.86 4,605.33 0.0062
25% 36,156.25 325,522,820.91 7,935.00 74,826,489.33 10,770.16 0.0098
50% 44,622.50 399,048,171.16 10,657.00 99,148,394.58 14,630.73 0.0099
75% 57,546.50 520,989,325.68 13,105.25 125,786,171.91 19,936.97 0.0100
max 156,021.00 1,562,166,750.41 36,698.00 361,429,655.92 246,675.56 0.0105
XOM mean 64,074.02 670,862,447.91 17,774.64 188,657,442.78 35,104.83 0.0097
std 28,483.97 265,569,760.30 10,924.37 93,450,720.08 127,162.28 0.0006
min 21,646.00 201,555,090.63 4,205.00 46,296,094.35 4,953.61 0.0051
25% 46,888.00 496,895,704.13 11,816.25 129,373,837.81 15,072.46 0.0097
50% 55,080.50 593,690,988.09 14,020.00 162,976,539.44 18,862.46 0.0098
75% 74,045.75 786,147,285.48 19,397.50 211,792,668.60 31,372.43 0.0099
max 209,816.00 1,761,362,028.61 75,421.00 613,405,517.24 2,003,841.58 0.0104
Table C.2: Summary ROC statistics over the 252 trading days in 2016 itemized by stock.
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